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- Стр. 1267/1273
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Thus
our
conception
of
free
will
and
inevitability
gradually
diminishes
or
increases
according
to
the
greater
or
lesser
connection
with
the
external
world
,
the
greater
or
lesser
remoteness
of
time
,
and
the
greater
or
lesser
dependence
on
the
causes
in
relation
to
which
we
contemplate
a
man
's
life
.
So
that
if
we
examine
the
case
of
a
man
whose
connection
with
the
external
world
is
well
known
,
where
the
time
between
the
action
and
its
examination
is
great
,
and
where
the
causes
of
the
action
are
most
accessible
,
we
get
the
conception
of
a
maximum
of
inevitability
and
a
minimum
of
free
will
.
If
we
examine
a
man
little
dependent
on
external
conditions
,
whose
action
was
performed
very
recently
,
and
the
causes
of
whose
action
are
beyond
our
ken
,
we
get
the
conception
of
a
minimum
of
inevitability
and
a
maximum
of
freedom
.
In
neither
case
--
however
we
may
change
our
point
of
view
,
however
plain
we
may
make
to
ourselves
the
connection
between
the
man
and
the
external
world
,
however
inaccessible
it
may
be
to
us
,
however
long
or
short
the
period
of
time
,
however
intelligible
or
incomprehensible
the
causes
of
the
action
may
be
--
can
we
ever
conceive
either
complete
freedom
or
complete
necessity
.
(
1
)
To
whatever
degree
we
may
imagine
a
man
to
be
exempt
from
the
influence
of
the
external
world
,
we
never
get
a
conception
of
freedom
in
space
.
Every
human
action
is
inevitably
conditioned
by
what
surrounds
him
and
by
his
own
body
.
I
lift
my
arm
and
let
it
fall
.
My
action
seems
to
me
free
;
but
asking
myself
whether
I
could
raise
my
arm
in
every
direction
,
I
see
that
I
raised
it
in
the
direction
in
which
there
was
least
obstruction
to
that
action
either
from
things
around
me
or
from
the
construction
of
my
own
body
.
I
chose
one
out
of
all
the
possible
directions
because
in
it
there
were
fewest
obstacles
.
For
my
action
to
be
free
it
was
necessary
that
it
should
encounter
no
obstacles
.
To
conceive
of
a
man
being
free
we
must
imagine
him
outside
space
,
which
is
evidently
impossible
.
(
2
)
However
much
we
approximate
the
time
of
judgment
to
the
time
of
the
deed
,
we
never
get
a
conception
of
freedom
in
time
.
For
if
I
examine
an
action
committed
a
second
ago
I
must
still
recognize
it
as
not
being
free
,
for
it
is
irrevocably
linked
to
the
moment
at
which
it
was
committed
.
Can
I
lift
my
arm
?
I
lift
it
,
but
ask
myself
:
could
I
have
abstained
from
lifting
my
arm
at
the
moment
that
has
already
passed
?
To
convince
myself
of
this
I
do
not
lift
it
the
next
moment
.
But
I
am
not
now
abstaining
from
doing
so
at
the
first
moment
when
I
asked
the
question
.
Time
has
gone
by
which
I
could
not
detain
,
the
arm
I
then
lifted
is
no
longer
the
same
as
the
arm
I
now
refrain
from
lifting
,
nor
is
the
air
in
which
I
lifted
it
the
same
that
now
surrounds
me
.
The
moment
in
which
the
first
movement
was
made
is
irrevocable
,
and
at
that
moment
I
could
make
only
one
movement
,
and
whatever
movement
I
made
would
be
the
only
one
.
That
I
did
not
lift
my
arm
a
moment
later
does
not
prove
that
I
could
have
abstained
from
lifting
it
then
.
And
since
I
could
make
only
one
movement
at
that
single
moment
of
time
,
it
could
not
have
been
any
other
.
To
imagine
it
as
free
,
it
is
necessary
to
imagine
it
in
the
present
,
on
the
boundary
between
the
past
and
the
future
--
that
is
,
outside
time
,
which
is
impossible
.
(
3
)
However
much
the
difficulty
of
understanding
the
causes
may
be
increased
,
we
never
reach
a
conception
of
complete
freedom
,
that
is
,
an
absence
of
cause
.
However
inaccessible
to
us
may
be
the
cause
of
the
expression
of
will
in
any
action
,
our
own
or
another
's
,
the
first
demand
of
reason
is
the
assumption
of
and
search
for
a
cause
,
for
without
a
cause
no
phenomenon
is
conceivable
.
I
raise
my
arm
to
perform
an
action
independently
of
any
cause
,
but
my
wish
to
perform
an
action
without
a
cause
is
the
cause
of
my
action
.
But
even
if
--
imagining
a
man
quite
exempt
from
all
influences
,
examining
only
his
momentary
action
in
the
present
,
unevoked
by
any
cause
--
we
were
to
admit
so
infinitely
small
a
remainder
of
inevitability
as
equaled
zero
,
we
should
even
then
not
have
arrived
at
the
conception
of
complete
freedom
in
man
,
for
a
being
uninfluenced
by
the
external
world
,
standing
outside
of
time
and
independent
of
cause
,
is
no
longer
a
man
.
In
the
same
way
we
can
never
imagine
the
action
of
a
man
quite
devoid
of
freedom
and
entirely
subject
to
the
law
of
inevitability
.
