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- Стр. 1265/1273
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Our
conception
of
the
degree
of
freedom
often
varies
according
to
differences
in
the
point
of
view
from
which
we
regard
the
event
,
but
every
human
action
appears
to
us
as
a
certain
combination
of
freedom
and
inevitability
.
In
every
action
we
examine
we
see
a
certain
measure
of
freedom
and
a
certain
measure
of
inevitability
.
And
always
the
more
freedom
we
see
in
any
action
the
less
inevitability
do
we
perceive
,
and
the
more
inevitability
the
less
freedom
.
The
proportion
of
freedom
to
inevitability
decreases
and
increases
according
to
the
point
of
view
from
which
the
action
is
regarded
,
but
their
relation
is
always
one
of
inverse
proportion
.
A
sinking
man
who
clutches
at
another
and
drowns
him
;
or
a
hungry
mother
exhausted
by
feeding
her
baby
,
who
steals
some
food
;
or
a
man
trained
to
discipline
who
on
duty
at
the
word
of
command
kills
a
defenseless
man
--
seem
less
guilty
,
that
is
,
less
free
and
more
subject
to
the
law
of
necessity
,
to
one
who
knows
the
circumstances
in
which
these
people
were
placed
,
and
more
free
to
one
who
does
not
know
that
the
man
was
himself
drowning
,
that
the
mother
was
hungry
,
that
the
soldier
was
in
the
ranks
,
and
so
on
.
Similarly
a
man
who
committed
a
murder
twenty
years
ago
and
has
since
lived
peaceably
and
harmlessly
in
society
seems
less
guilty
and
his
action
more
due
to
the
law
of
inevitability
,
to
someone
who
considers
his
action
after
twenty
years
have
elapsed
than
to
one
who
examined
it
the
day
after
it
was
committed
.
And
in
the
same
way
every
action
of
an
insane
,
intoxicated
,
or
highly
excited
man
appears
less
free
and
more
inevitable
to
one
who
knows
the
mental
condition
of
him
who
committed
the
action
,
and
seems
more
free
and
less
inevitable
to
one
who
does
not
know
it
.
In
all
these
cases
the
conception
of
freedom
is
increased
or
diminished
and
the
conception
of
compulsion
is
correspondingly
decreased
or
increased
,
according
to
the
point
of
view
from
which
the
action
is
regarded
.
So
that
the
greater
the
conception
of
necessity
the
smaller
the
conception
of
freedom
and
vice
versa
.
Religion
,
the
common
sense
of
mankind
,
the
science
of
jurisprudence
,
and
history
itself
understand
alike
this
relation
between
necessity
and
freedom
.
All
cases
without
exception
in
which
our
conception
of
freedom
and
necessity
is
increased
and
diminished
depend
on
three
considerations
:
(
1
)
The
relation
to
the
external
world
of
the
man
who
commits
the
deeds
.
(
2
)
His
relation
to
time
.
(
3
)
His
relation
to
the
causes
leading
to
the
action
.
The
first
consideration
is
the
clearness
of
our
perception
of
the
man
's
relation
to
the
external
world
and
the
greater
or
lesser
clearness
of
our
understanding
of
the
definite
position
occupied
by
the
man
in
relation
to
everything
coexisting
with
him
.
This
is
what
makes
it
evident
that
a
drowning
man
is
less
free
and
more
subject
to
necessity
than
one
standing
on
dry
ground
,
and
that
makes
the
actions
of
a
man
closely
connected
with
others
in
a
thickly
populated
district
,
or
of
one
bound
by
family
,
official
,
or
business
duties
,
seem
certainly
less
free
and
more
subject
to
necessity
than
those
of
a
man
living
in
solitude
and
seclusion
.
If
we
consider
a
man
alone
,
apart
from
his
relation
to
everything
around
him
,
each
action
of
his
seems
to
us
free
.
But
if
we
see
his
relation
to
anything
around
him
,
if
we
see
his
connection
with
anything
whatever
--
with
a
man
who
speaks
to
him
,
a
book
he
reads
,
the
work
on
which
he
is
engaged
,
even
with
the
air
he
breathes
or
the
light
that
falls
on
the
things
about
him
--
we
see
that
each
of
these
circumstances
has
an
influence
on
him
and
controls
at
least
some
side
of
his
activity
.
And
the
more
we
perceive
of
these
influences
the
more
our
conception
of
his
freedom
diminishes
and
the
more
our
conception
of
the
necessity
that
weighs
on
him
increases
.
