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- Стр. 1266/1273
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The
second
consideration
is
the
more
or
less
evident
time
relation
of
the
man
to
the
world
and
the
clearness
of
our
perception
of
the
place
the
man
's
action
occupies
in
time
.
That
is
the
ground
which
makes
the
fall
of
the
first
man
,
resulting
in
the
production
of
the
human
race
,
appear
evidently
less
free
than
a
man
's
entry
into
marriage
today
.
It
is
the
reason
why
the
life
and
activity
of
people
who
lived
centuries
ago
and
are
connected
with
me
in
time
can
not
seem
to
me
as
free
as
the
life
of
a
contemporary
,
the
consequences
of
which
are
still
unknown
to
me
.
The
degree
of
our
conception
of
freedom
or
inevitability
depends
in
this
respect
on
the
greater
or
lesser
lapse
of
time
between
the
performance
of
the
action
and
our
judgment
of
it
.
If
I
examine
an
act
I
performed
a
moment
ago
in
approximately
the
same
circumstances
as
those
I
am
in
now
,
my
action
appears
to
me
undoubtedly
free
.
But
if
I
examine
an
act
performed
a
month
ago
,
then
being
in
different
circumstances
,
I
can
not
help
recognizing
that
if
that
act
had
not
been
committed
much
that
resulted
from
it
--
good
,
agreeable
,
and
even
essential
--
would
not
have
taken
place
.
If
I
reflect
on
an
action
still
more
remote
,
ten
years
ago
or
more
,
then
the
consequences
of
my
action
are
still
plainer
to
me
and
I
find
it
hard
to
imagine
what
would
have
happened
had
that
action
not
been
performed
.
The
farther
I
go
back
in
memory
,
or
what
is
the
same
thing
the
farther
I
go
forward
in
my
judgment
,
the
more
doubtful
becomes
my
belief
in
the
freedom
of
my
action
.
In
history
we
find
a
very
similar
progress
of
conviction
concerning
the
part
played
by
free
will
in
the
general
affairs
of
humanity
.
A
contemporary
event
seems
to
us
to
be
indubitably
the
doing
of
all
the
known
participants
,
but
with
a
more
remote
event
we
already
see
its
inevitable
results
which
prevent
our
considering
anything
else
possible
.
And
the
farther
we
go
back
in
examining
events
the
less
arbitrary
do
they
appear
.
The
Austro-Prussian
war
appears
to
us
undoubtedly
the
result
of
the
crafty
conduct
of
Bismarck
,
and
so
on
.
The
Napoleonic
wars
still
seem
to
us
,
though
already
questionably
,
to
be
the
outcome
of
their
heroes
'
will
.
But
in
the
Crusades
we
already
see
an
event
occupying
its
definite
place
in
history
and
without
which
we
can
not
imagine
the
modern
history
of
Europe
,
though
to
the
chroniclers
of
the
Crusades
that
event
appeared
as
merely
due
to
the
will
of
certain
people
.
In
regard
to
the
migration
of
the
peoples
it
does
not
enter
anyone
's
head
today
to
suppose
that
the
renovation
of
the
European
world
depended
on
Attila
's
caprice
.
The
farther
back
in
history
the
object
of
our
observation
lies
,
the
more
doubtful
does
the
free
will
of
those
concerned
in
the
event
become
and
the
more
manifest
the
law
of
inevitability
.
The
third
consideration
is
the
degree
to
which
we
apprehend
that
endless
chain
of
causation
inevitably
demanded
by
reason
,
in
which
each
phenomenon
comprehended
,
and
therefore
man
's
every
action
,
must
have
its
definite
place
as
a
result
of
what
has
gone
before
and
as
a
cause
of
what
will
follow
.
The
better
we
are
acquainted
with
the
physiological
,
psychological
,
and
historical
laws
deduced
by
observation
and
by
which
man
is
controlled
,
and
the
more
correctly
we
perceive
the
physiological
,
psychological
,
and
historical
causes
of
the
action
,
and
the
simpler
the
action
we
are
observing
and
the
less
complex
the
character
and
mind
of
the
man
in
question
,
the
more
subject
to
inevitability
and
the
less
free
do
our
actions
and
those
of
others
appear
.
When
we
do
not
at
all
understand
the
cause
of
an
action
,
whether
a
crime
,
a
good
action
,
or
even
one
that
is
simply
nonmoral
,
we
ascribe
a
greater
amount
of
freedom
to
it
.
In
the
case
of
a
crime
we
most
urgently
demand
the
punishment
for
such
an
act
;
in
the
case
of
a
virtuous
act
we
rate
its
merit
most
highly
.
In
an
indifferent
case
we
recognize
in
it
more
individuality
,
originality
,
and
independence
.
But
if
even
one
of
the
innumerable
causes
of
the
act
is
known
to
us
we
recognize
a
certain
element
of
necessity
and
are
less
insistent
on
punishment
for
the
crime
,
or
the
acknowledgment
of
the
merit
of
the
virtuous
act
,
or
the
freedom
of
the
apparently
original
action
.
That
a
criminal
was
reared
among
malefactors
mitigates
his
fault
in
our
eyes
.
The
self-sacrifice
of
a
father
or
mother
,
or
self-sacrifice
with
the
possibility
of
a
reward
,
is
more
comprehensible
than
gratuitous
self-sacrifice
,
and
therefore
seems
less
deserving
of
sympathy
and
less
the
result
of
free
will
.
The
founder
of
a
sect
or
party
,
or
an
inventor
,
impresses
us
less
when
we
know
how
or
by
what
the
way
was
prepared
for
his
activity
If
we
have
a
large
range
of
examples
,
if
our
observation
is
constantly
directed
to
seeking
the
correlation
of
cause
and
effect
in
people
's
actions
,
their
actions
appear
to
us
more
under
compulsion
and
less
free
the
more
correctly
we
connect
the
effects
with
the
causes
.
If
we
examined
simple
actions
and
had
a
vast
number
of
such
actions
under
observation
,
our
conception
of
their
inevitability
would
be
still
greater
.
The
dishonest
conduct
of
the
son
of
a
dishonest
father
,
the
misconduct
of
a
woman
who
had
fallen
into
bad
company
,
a
drunkard
's
relapse
into
drunkenness
,
and
so
on
are
actions
that
seem
to
us
less
free
the
better
we
understand
their
cause
.
If
the
man
whose
actions
we
are
considering
is
on
a
very
low
stage
of
mental
development
,
like
a
child
,
a
madman
,
or
a
simpleton
--
then
,
knowing
the
causes
of
the
act
and
the
simplicity
of
the
character
and
intelligence
in
question
,
we
see
so
large
an
element
of
necessity
and
so
little
free
will
that
as
soon
as
we
know
the
cause
prompting
the
action
we
can
foretell
the
result
.
On
these
three
considerations
alone
is
based
the
conception
of
irresponsibility
for
crimes
and
the
extenuating
circumstances
admitted
by
all
legislative
codes
.
The
responsibility
appears
greater
or
less
according
to
our
greater
or
lesser
knowledge
of
the
circumstances
in
which
the
man
was
placed
whose
action
is
being
judged
,
and
according
to
the
greater
or
lesser
interval
of
time
between
the
commission
of
the
action
and
its
investigation
,
and
according
to
the
greater
or
lesser
understanding
of
the
causes
that
led
to
the
action
.
