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- Стр. 1264/1273
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If
men
descended
from
the
apes
at
an
unknown
period
of
time
,
that
is
as
comprehensible
as
that
they
were
made
from
a
handful
of
earth
at
a
certain
period
of
time
(
in
the
first
case
the
unknown
quantity
is
the
time
,
in
the
second
case
it
is
the
origin
)
;
and
the
question
of
how
man
's
consciousness
of
freedom
is
to
be
reconciled
with
the
law
of
necessity
to
which
he
is
subject
can
not
be
solved
by
comparative
physiology
and
zoology
,
for
in
a
frog
,
a
rabbit
,
or
an
ape
,
we
can
observe
only
the
muscular
nervous
activity
,
but
in
man
we
observe
consciousness
as
well
as
the
muscular
and
nervous
activity
The
naturalists
and
their
followers
,
thinking
they
can
solve
this
question
,
are
like
plasterers
set
to
plaster
one
side
of
the
walls
of
a
church
who
,
availing
themselves
of
the
absence
of
the
chief
superintendent
of
the
work
,
should
in
an
access
of
zeal
plaster
over
the
windows
,
icons
,
woodwork
,
and
still
unbuttressed
walls
,
and
should
be
delighted
that
from
their
point
of
view
as
plasterers
,
everything
is
now
so
smooth
and
regular
.
For
the
solution
of
the
question
of
free
will
or
inevitability
,
history
has
this
advantage
over
other
branches
of
knowledge
in
which
the
question
is
dealt
with
,
that
for
history
this
question
does
not
refer
to
the
essence
of
man
's
free
will
but
its
manifestation
in
the
past
and
under
certain
conditions
.
In
regard
to
this
question
,
history
stands
to
the
other
sciences
as
experimental
science
stands
to
abstract
science
.
The
subject
for
history
is
not
man
's
will
itself
but
our
presentation
of
it
.
And
so
for
history
,
the
insoluble
mystery
presented
by
the
incompatibility
of
free
will
and
inevitability
does
not
exist
as
it
does
for
theology
,
ethics
,
and
philosophy
.
History
surveys
a
presentation
of
man
's
life
in
which
the
union
of
these
two
contradictions
has
already
taken
place
.
In
actual
life
each
historic
event
,
each
human
action
,
is
very
clearly
and
definitely
understood
without
any
sense
of
contradiction
,
although
each
event
presents
itself
as
partly
free
and
partly
compulsory
.
To
solve
the
question
of
how
freedom
and
necessity
are
combined
and
what
constitutes
the
essence
of
these
two
conceptions
,
the
philosophy
of
history
can
and
should
follow
a
path
contrary
to
that
taken
by
other
sciences
.
Instead
of
first
defining
the
conceptions
of
freedom
and
inevitability
in
themselves
,
and
then
ranging
the
phenomena
of
life
under
those
definitions
,
history
should
deduce
a
definition
of
the
conception
of
freedom
and
inevitability
themselves
from
the
immense
quantity
of
phenomena
of
which
it
is
cognizant
and
that
always
appear
dependent
on
these
two
elements
.
Whatever
presentation
of
the
activity
of
many
men
or
of
an
individual
we
may
consider
,
we
always
regard
it
as
the
result
partly
of
man
's
free
will
and
partly
of
the
law
of
inevitability
.
Whether
we
speak
of
the
migration
of
the
peoples
and
the
incursions
of
the
barbarians
,
or
of
the
decrees
of
Napoleon
III
,
or
of
someone
's
action
an
hour
ago
in
choosing
one
direction
out
of
several
for
his
walk
,
we
are
unconscious
of
any
contradiction
.
The
degree
of
freedom
and
inevitability
governing
the
actions
of
these
people
is
clearly
defined
for
us
.
