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"
He
ought
to
have
acted
in
this
way
and
in
that
way
.
In
this
case
he
did
well
and
in
that
case
badly
.
He
behaved
admirably
at
the
beginning
of
his
reign
and
during
1812
,
but
acted
badly
by
giving
a
constitution
to
Poland
,
forming
the
Holy
Alliance
,
entrusting
power
to
Arakchéev
,
favoring
Golítsyn
and
mysticism
,
and
afterwards
Shishkóv
and
Photius
.
He
also
acted
badly
by
concerning
himself
with
the
active
army
and
disbanding
the
Semënov
regiment
.
"
It
would
take
a
dozen
pages
to
enumerate
all
the
reproaches
the
historians
address
to
him
,
based
on
their
knowledge
of
what
is
good
for
humanity
.
What
do
these
reproaches
mean
?
Do
not
the
very
actions
for
which
the
historians
praise
Alexander
I
(
the
liberal
attempts
at
the
beginning
of
his
reign
,
his
struggle
with
Napoleon
,
the
firmness
he
displayed
in
1812
and
the
campaign
of
1813
)
flow
from
the
same
sources
--
the
circumstances
of
his
birth
,
education
,
and
life
--
that
made
his
personality
what
it
was
and
from
which
the
actions
for
which
they
blame
him
(
the
Holy
Alliance
,
the
restoration
of
Poland
,
and
the
reaction
of
1820
and
later
)
also
flowed
?
In
what
does
the
substance
of
those
reproaches
lie
?
It
lies
in
the
fact
that
an
historic
character
like
Alexander
I
,
standing
on
the
highest
possible
pinnacle
of
human
power
with
the
blinding
light
of
history
focused
upon
him
;
a
character
exposed
to
those
strongest
of
all
influences
:
the
intrigues
,
flattery
,
and
self-deception
inseparable
from
power
;
a
character
who
at
every
moment
of
his
life
felt
a
responsibility
for
all
that
was
happening
in
Europe
;
and
not
a
fictitious
but
a
live
character
who
like
every
man
had
his
personal
habits
,
passions
,
and
impulses
toward
goodness
,
beauty
,
and
truth
--
that
this
character
--
though
not
lacking
in
virtue
(
the
historians
do
not
accuse
him
of
that
)
--
had
not
the
same
conception
of
the
welfare
of
humanity
fifty
years
ago
as
a
present-day
professor
who
from
his
youth
upwards
has
been
occupied
with
learning
:
that
is
,
with
books
and
lectures
and
with
taking
notes
from
them
.
But
even
if
we
assume
that
fifty
years
ago
Alexander
I
was
mistaken
in
his
view
of
what
was
good
for
the
people
,
we
must
inevitably
assume
that
the
historian
who
judges
Alexander
will
also
after
the
lapse
of
some
time
turn
out
to
be
mistaken
in
his
view
of
what
is
good
for
humanity
.
This
assumption
is
all
the
more
natural
and
inevitable
because
,
watching
the
movement
of
history
,
we
see
that
every
year
and
with
each
new
writer
,
opinion
as
to
what
is
good
for
mankind
changes
;
so
that
what
once
seemed
good
,
ten
years
later
seems
bad
,
and
vice
versa
.
And
what
is
more
,
we
find
at
one
and
the
same
time
quite
contradictory
views
as
to
what
is
bad
and
what
is
good
in
history
:
some
people
regard
giving
a
constitution
to
Poland
and
forming
the
Holy
Alliance
as
praiseworthy
in
Alexander
,
while
others
regard
it
as
blameworthy
.
The
activity
of
Alexander
or
of
Napoleon
can
not
be
called
useful
or
harmful
,
for
it
is
impossible
to
say
for
what
it
was
useful
or
harmful
.
If
that
activity
displeases
somebody
,
this
is
only
because
it
does
not
agree
with
his
limited
understanding
of
what
is
good
.
Whether
the
preservation
of
my
father
's
house
in
Moscow
,
or
the
glory
of
the
Russian
arms
,
or
the
prosperity
of
the
Petersburg
and
other
universities
,
or
the
freedom
of
Poland
or
the
greatness
of
Russia
,
or
the
balance
of
power
in
Europe
,
or
a
certain
kind
of
European
culture
called
"
progress
"
appear
to
me
to
be
good
or
bad
,
I
must
admit
that
besides
these
things
the
action
of
every
historic
character
has
other
more
general
purposes
inaccessible
to
me
But
let
us
assume
that
what
is
called
science
can
harmonize
all
contradictions
and
possesses
an
unchanging
standard
of
good
and
bad
by
which
to
try
historic
characters
and
events
;
let
us
say
that
Alexander
could
have
done
everything
differently
;
let
us
say
that
with
guidance
from
those
who
blame
him
and
who
profess
to
know
the
ultimate
aim
of
the
movement
of
humanity
,
he
might
have
arranged
matters
according
to
the
program
his
present
accusers
would
have
given
him
--
of
nationality
,
freedom
,
equality
,
and
progress
(
these
,
I
think
,
cover
the
ground
)
.
Let
us
assume
that
this
program
was
possible
and
had
then
been
formulated
,
and
that
Alexander
had
acted
on
it
.
What
would
then
have
become
of
the
activity
of
all
those
who
opposed
the
tendency
that
then
prevailed
in
the
government
--
an
activity
that
in
the
opinion
of
the
historians
was
good
and
beneficent
?
Their
activity
would
not
have
existed
:
there
would
have
been
no
life
,
there
would
have
been
nothing
.
If
we
admit
that
human
life
can
be
ruled
by
reason
,
the
possibility
of
life
is
destroyed
.
