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There
was
not
a
trace
of
agitation
on
his
face
.
With
delicate
irony
he
questioned
Prince
Andrew
about
the
details
of
his
interview
with
the
Emperor
,
about
the
remarks
he
had
heard
at
court
concerning
the
Krems
affair
,
and
about
some
ladies
they
both
knew
.
On
November
1
Kutúzov
had
received
,
through
a
spy
,
news
that
the
army
he
commanded
was
in
an
almost
hopeless
position
.
The
spy
reported
that
the
French
,
after
crossing
the
bridge
at
Vienna
,
were
advancing
in
immense
force
upon
Kutúzov
's
line
of
communication
with
the
troops
that
were
arriving
from
Russia
.
If
Kutúzov
decided
to
remain
at
Krems
,
Napoleon
's
army
of
one
hundred
and
fifty
thousand
men
would
cut
him
off
completely
and
surround
his
exhausted
army
of
forty
thousand
,
and
he
would
find
himself
in
the
position
of
Mack
at
Ulm
.
If
Kutúzov
decided
to
abandon
the
road
connecting
him
with
the
troops
arriving
from
Russia
,
he
would
have
to
march
with
no
road
into
unknown
parts
of
the
Bohemian
mountains
,
defending
himself
against
superior
forces
of
the
enemy
and
abandoning
all
hope
of
a
junction
with
Buxhöwden
.
If
Kutúzov
decided
to
retreat
along
the
road
from
Krems
to
Olmütz
,
to
unite
with
the
troops
arriving
from
Russia
,
he
risked
being
forestalled
on
that
road
by
the
French
who
had
crossed
the
Vienna
bridge
,
and
encumbered
by
his
baggage
and
transport
,
having
to
accept
battle
on
the
march
against
an
enemy
three
times
as
strong
,
who
would
hem
him
in
from
two
sides
.
Kutúzov
chose
this
latter
course
.
The
French
,
the
spy
reported
,
having
crossed
the
Vienna
bridge
,
were
advancing
by
forced
marches
toward
Znaim
,
which
lay
sixty-six
miles
off
on
the
line
of
Kutúzov
's
retreat
.
If
he
reached
Znaim
before
the
French
,
there
would
be
great
hope
of
saving
the
army
;
to
let
the
French
forestall
him
at
Znaim
meant
the
exposure
of
his
whole
army
to
a
disgrace
such
as
that
of
Ulm
,
or
to
utter
destruction
.
But
to
forestall
the
French
with
his
whole
army
was
impossible
.
The
road
for
the
French
from
Vienna
to
Znaim
was
shorter
and
better
than
the
road
for
the
Russians
from
Krems
to
Znaim
.
The
night
he
received
the
news
,
Kutúzov
sent
Bagratión
's
vanguard
,
four
thousand
strong
,
to
the
right
across
the
hills
from
the
Krems-Znaim
to
the
Vienna-Znaim
road
.
Bagratión
was
to
make
this
march
without
resting
,
and
to
halt
facing
Vienna
with
Znaim
to
his
rear
,
and
if
he
succeeded
in
forestalling
the
French
he
was
to
delay
them
as
long
as
possible
.
Kutúzov
himself
with
all
his
transport
took
the
road
to
Znaim
.
Marching
thirty
miles
that
stormy
night
across
roadless
hills
,
with
his
hungry
,
ill-shod
soldiers
,
and
losing
a
third
of
his
men
as
stragglers
by
the
way
,
Bagratión
came
out
on
the
Vienna-Znaim
road
at
Hollabrünn
a
few
hours
ahead
of
the
French
who
were
approaching
Hollabrünn
from
Vienna
.
Kutúzov
with
his
transport
had
still
to
march
for
some
days
before
he
could
reach
Znaim
.
Hence
Bagratión
with
his
four
thousand
hungry
,
exhausted
men
would
have
to
detain
for
days
the
whole
enemy
army
that
came
upon
him
at
Hollabrünn
,
which
was
clearly
impossible
.
But
a
freak
of
fate
made
the
impossible
possible
.
The
success
of
the
trick
that
had
placed
the
Vienna
bridge
in
the
hands
of
the
French
without
a
fight
led
Murat
to
try
to
deceive
Kutúzov
in
a
similar
way
.
Meeting
Bagratión
's
weak
detachment
on
the
Znaim
road
he
supposed
it
to
be
Kutúzov
's
whole
army
.
To
be
able
to
crush
it
absolutely
he
awaited
the
arrival
of
the
rest
of
the
troops
who
were
on
their
way
from
Vienna
,
and
with
this
object
offered
a
three
days
'
truce
on
condition
that
both
armies
should
remain
in
position
without
moving
.
Murat
declared
that
negotiations
for
peace
were
already
proceeding
,
and
that
he
therefore
offered
this
truce
to
avoid
unnecessary
bloodshed
.
Count
Nostitz
,
the
Austrian
general
occupying
the
advanced
posts
,
believed
Murat
's
emissary
and
retired
,
leaving
Bagratión
's
division
exposed
.
Another
emissary
rode
to
the
Russian
line
to
announce
the
peace
negotiations
and
to
offer
the
Russian
army
the
three
days
'
truce
.
Bagratión
replied
that
he
was
not
authorized
either
to
accept
or
refuse
a
truce
and
sent
his
adjutant
to
Kutúzov
to
report
the
offer
he
had
received
.
A
truce
was
Kutúzov
's
sole
chance
of
gaining
time
,
giving
Bagratión
's
exhausted
troops
some
rest
,
and
letting
the
transport
and
heavy
convoys
(
whose
movements
were
concealed
from
the
French
)
advance
if
but
one
stage
nearer
Znaim
.
The
offer
of
a
truce
gave
the
only
,
and
a
quite
unexpected
,
chance
of
saving
the
army
.
On
receiving
the
news
he
immediately
dispatched
Adjutant
General
Wintzingerode
,
who
was
in
attendance
on
him
,
to
the
enemy
camp
.
Wintzingerode
was
not
merely
to
agree
to
the
truce
but
also
to
offer
terms
of
capitulation
,
and
meanwhile
Kutúzov
sent
his
adjutants
back
to
hasten
to
the
utmost
the
movements
of
the
baggage
trains
of
the
entire
army
along
the
Krems-Znaim
road
.
Bagratión
's
exhausted
and
hungry
detachment
,
which
alone
covered
this
movement
of
the
transport
and
of
the
whole
army
,
had
to
remain
stationary
in
face
of
an
enemy
eight
times
as
strong
as
itself
.
