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Peasants
having
no
clear
idea
of
the
cause
of
rain
,
say
,
according
to
whether
they
want
rain
or
fine
weather
:
"
The
wind
has
blown
the
clouds
away
,
"
or
,
"
The
wind
has
brought
up
the
clouds
.
"
And
in
the
same
way
the
universal
historians
sometimes
,
when
it
pleases
them
and
fits
in
with
their
theory
,
say
that
power
is
the
result
of
events
,
and
sometimes
,
when
they
want
to
prove
something
else
,
say
that
power
produces
events
.
A
third
class
of
historians
--
the
so-called
historians
of
culture
--
following
the
path
laid
down
by
the
universal
historians
who
sometimes
accept
writers
and
ladies
as
forces
producing
events
--
again
take
that
force
to
be
something
quite
different
.
They
see
it
in
what
is
called
culture
--
in
mental
activity
.
The
historians
of
culture
are
quite
consistent
in
regard
to
their
progenitors
,
the
writers
of
universal
histories
,
for
if
historical
events
may
be
explained
by
the
fact
that
certain
persons
treated
one
another
in
such
and
such
ways
,
why
not
explain
them
by
the
fact
that
such
and
such
people
wrote
such
and
such
books
?
Of
the
immense
number
of
indications
accompanying
every
vital
phenomenon
,
these
historians
select
the
indication
of
intellectual
activity
and
say
that
this
indication
is
the
cause
.
But
despite
their
endeavors
to
prove
that
the
cause
of
events
lies
in
intellectual
activity
,
only
by
a
great
stretch
can
one
admit
that
there
is
any
connection
between
intellectual
activity
and
the
movement
of
peoples
,
and
in
no
case
can
one
admit
that
intellectual
activity
controls
people
's
actions
,
for
that
view
is
not
confirmed
by
such
facts
as
the
very
cruel
murders
of
the
French
Revolution
resulting
from
the
doctrine
of
the
equality
of
man
,
or
the
very
cruel
wars
and
executions
resulting
from
the
preaching
of
love
.
But
even
admitting
as
correct
all
the
cunningly
devised
arguments
with
which
these
histories
are
filled
--
admitting
that
nations
are
governed
by
some
undefined
force
called
an
idea
--
history
's
essential
question
still
remains
unanswered
,
and
to
the
former
power
of
monarchs
and
to
the
influence
of
advisers
and
other
people
introduced
by
the
universal
historians
,
another
,
newer
force
--
the
idea
--
is
added
,
the
connection
of
which
with
the
masses
needs
explanation
.
It
is
possible
to
understand
that
Napoleon
had
power
and
so
events
occurred
;
with
some
effort
one
may
even
conceive
that
Napoleon
together
with
other
influences
was
the
cause
of
an
event
;
but
how
a
book
,
Le
Contrat
Social
,
had
the
effect
of
making
Frenchmen
begin
to
drown
one
another
can
not
be
understood
without
an
explanation
of
the
causal
nexus
of
this
new
force
with
the
event
.
Undoubtedly
some
relation
exists
between
all
who
live
contemporaneously
,
and
so
it
is
possible
to
find
some
connection
between
the
intellectual
activity
of
men
and
their
historical
movements
,
just
as
such
a
connection
may
be
found
between
the
movements
of
humanity
and
commerce
,
handicraft
,
gardening
,
or
anything
else
you
please
.
But
why
intellectual
activity
is
considered
by
the
historians
of
culture
to
be
the
cause
or
expression
of
the
whole
historical
movement
is
hard
to
understand
.
Only
the
following
considerations
can
have
led
the
historians
to
such
a
conclusion
:
(
1
)
that
history
is
written
by
learned
men
,
and
so
it
is
natural
and
agreeable
for
them
to
think
that
the
activity
of
their
class
supplies
the
basis
of
the
movement
of
all
humanity
,
just
as
a
similar
belief
is
natural
and
agreeable
to
traders
,
agriculturists
,
and
soldiers
(
if
they
do
not
express
it
,
that
is
merely
because
traders
and
soldiers
do
not
write
history
)
,
and
(
2
)
that
spiritual
activity
,
enlightenment
,
civilization
,
culture
,
ideas
,
are
all
indistinct
,
indefinite
conceptions
under
whose
banner
it
is
very
easy
to
use
words
having
a
still
less
definite
meaning
,
and
which
can
therefore
be
readily
introduced
into
any
theory
But
not
to
speak
of
the
intrinsic
quality
of
histories
of
this
kind
(
which
may
possibly
even
be
of
use
to
someone
for
something
)
the
histories
of
culture
,
to
which
all
general
histories
tend
more
and
more
to
approximate
,
are
significant
from
the
fact
that
after
seriously
and
minutely
examining
various
religious
,
philosophic
,
and
political
doctrines
as
causes
of
events
,
as
soon
as
they
have
to
describe
an
actual
historic
event
such
as
the
campaign
of
1812
for
instance
,
they
involuntarily
describe
it
as
resulting
from
an
exercise
of
power
--
and
say
plainly
that
that
was
the
result
of
Napoleon
's
will
.
Speaking
so
,
the
historians
of
culture
involuntarily
contradict
themselves
,
and
show
that
the
new
force
they
have
devised
does
not
account
for
what
happens
in
history
,
and
that
history
can
only
be
explained
by
introducing
a
power
which
they
apparently
do
not
recognize
.
A
locomotive
is
moving
.
Someone
asks
:
"
What
moves
it
?
"
A
peasant
says
the
devil
moves
it
.
Another
man
says
the
locomotive
moves
because
its
wheels
go
round
.
A
third
asserts
that
the
cause
of
its
movement
lies
in
the
smoke
which
the
wind
carries
away
.
The
peasant
is
irrefutable
.
He
has
devised
a
complete
explanation
.
To
refute
him
someone
would
have
to
prove
to
him
that
there
is
no
devil
,
or
another
peasant
would
have
to
explain
to
him
that
it
is
not
the
devil
but
a
German
,
who
moves
the
locomotive
.
Only
then
,
as
a
result
of
the
contradiction
,
will
they
see
that
they
are
both
wrong
.
But
the
man
who
says
that
the
movement
of
the
wheels
is
the
cause
refutes
himself
,
for
having
once
begun
to
analyze
he
ought
to
go
on
and
explain
further
why
the
wheels
go
round
;
and
till
he
has
reached
the
ultimate
cause
of
the
movement
of
the
locomotive
in
the
pressure
of
steam
in
the
boiler
,
he
has
no
right
to
stop
in
his
search
for
the
cause
.
The
man
who
explains
the
movement
of
the
locomotive
by
the
smoke
that
is
carried
back
has
noticed
that
the
wheels
do
not
supply
an
explanation
and
has
taken
the
first
sign
that
occurs
to
him
and
in
his
turn
has
offered
that
as
an
explanation
.
The
only
conception
that
can
explain
the
movement
of
the
locomotive
is
that
of
a
force
commensurate
with
the
movement
observed
.
