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- Стр. 1164/1273
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The
stars
,
as
if
knowing
that
no
one
was
looking
at
them
,
began
to
disport
themselves
in
the
dark
sky
:
now
flaring
up
,
now
vanishing
,
now
trembling
,
they
were
busy
whispering
something
gladsome
and
mysterious
to
one
another
.
The
French
army
melted
away
at
the
uniform
rate
of
a
mathematical
progression
;
and
that
crossing
of
the
Berëzina
about
which
so
much
has
been
written
was
only
one
intermediate
stage
in
its
destruction
,
and
not
at
all
the
decisive
episode
of
the
campaign
.
If
so
much
has
been
and
still
is
written
about
the
Berëzina
,
on
the
French
side
this
is
only
because
at
the
broken
bridge
across
that
river
the
calamities
their
army
had
been
previously
enduring
were
suddenly
concentrated
at
one
moment
into
a
tragic
spectacle
that
remained
in
every
memory
,
and
on
the
Russian
side
merely
because
in
Petersburg
--
far
from
the
seat
of
war
--
a
plan
(
again
one
of
Pfuel
's
)
had
been
devised
to
catch
Napoleon
in
a
strategic
trap
at
the
Berëzina
River
.
Everyone
assured
himself
that
all
would
happen
according
to
plan
,
and
therefore
insisted
that
it
was
just
the
crossing
of
the
Berëzina
that
destroyed
the
French
army
.
In
reality
the
results
of
the
crossing
were
much
less
disastrous
to
the
French
--
in
guns
and
men
lost
--
than
Krásnoe
had
been
,
as
the
figures
show
.
The
sole
importance
of
the
crossing
of
the
Berëzina
lies
in
the
fact
that
it
plainly
and
indubitably
proved
the
fallacy
of
all
the
plans
for
cutting
off
the
enemy
's
retreat
and
the
soundness
of
the
only
possible
line
of
action
--
the
one
Kutúzov
and
the
general
mass
of
the
army
demanded
--
namely
,
simply
to
follow
the
enemy
up
.
The
French
crowd
fled
at
a
continually
increasing
speed
and
all
its
energy
was
directed
to
reaching
its
goal
.
It
fled
like
a
wounded
animal
and
it
was
impossible
to
block
its
path
.
This
was
shown
not
so
much
by
the
arrangements
it
made
for
crossing
as
by
what
took
place
at
the
bridges
.
When
the
bridges
broke
down
,
unarmed
soldiers
,
people
from
Moscow
and
women
with
children
who
were
with
the
French
transport
,
all
--
carried
on
by
vis
inertiæ
--
pressed
forward
into
boats
and
into
the
ice-covered
water
and
did
not
surrender
.
That
impulse
was
reasonable
.
The
condition
of
fugitives
and
of
pursuers
was
equally
bad
.
As
long
as
they
remained
with
their
own
people
each
might
hope
for
help
from
his
fellows
and
the
definite
place
he
held
among
them
.
But
those
who
surrendered
,
while
remaining
in
the
same
pitiful
plight
,
would
be
on
a
lower
level
to
claim
a
share
in
the
necessities
of
life
.
The
French
did
not
need
to
be
informed
of
the
fact
that
half
the
prisoners
--
with
whom
the
Russians
did
not
know
what
to
do
--
perished
of
cold
and
hunger
despite
their
captors
'
desire
to
save
them
;
they
felt
that
it
could
not
be
otherwise
.
The
most
compassionate
Russian
commanders
,
those
favorable
to
the
French
--
and
even
the
Frenchmen
in
the
Russian
service
--
could
do
nothing
for
the
prisoners
.
The
French
perished
from
the
conditions
to
which
the
Russian
army
was
itself
exposed
.
It
was
impossible
to
take
bread
and
clothes
from
our
hungry
and
indispensable
soldiers
to
give
to
the
French
who
,
though
not
harmful
,
or
hated
,
or
guilty
,
were
simply
unnecessary
.
Some
Russians
even
did
that
,
but
they
were
exceptions
.
Certain
destruction
lay
behind
the
French
but
in
front
there
was
hope
.
Their
ships
had
been
burned
,
there
was
no
salvation
save
in
collective
flight
,
and
on
that
the
whole
strength
of
the
French
was
concentrated
.
The
farther
they
fled
the
more
wretched
became
the
plight
of
the
remnant
,
especially
after
the
Berëzina
,
on
which
(
in
consequence
of
the
Petersburg
plan
)
special
hopes
had
been
placed
by
the
Russians
,
and
the
keener
grew
the
passions
of
the
Russian
commanders
,
who
blamed
one
another
and
Kutúzov
most
of
all
.
Anticipation
that
the
failure
of
the
Petersburg
Berëzina
plan
would
be
attributed
to
Kutúzov
led
to
dissatisfaction
,
contempt
,
and
ridicule
,
more
and
more
strongly
expressed
.
The
ridicule
and
contempt
were
of
course
expressed
in
a
respectful
form
,
making
it
impossible
for
him
to
ask
wherein
he
was
to
blame
.
They
did
not
talk
seriously
to
him
;
when
reporting
to
him
or
asking
for
his
sanction
they
appeared
to
be
fulfilling
a
regrettable
formality
,
but
they
winked
behind
his
back
and
tried
to
mislead
him
at
every
turn
.
Because
they
could
not
understand
him
all
these
people
assumed
that
it
was
useless
to
talk
to
the
old
man
;
that
he
would
never
grasp
the
profundity
of
their
plans
,
that
he
would
answer
with
his
phrases
(
which
they
thought
were
mere
phrases
)
about
a
"
golden
bridge
,
"
about
the
impossibility
of
crossing
the
frontier
with
a
crowd
of
tatterdemalions
,
and
so
forth
.
They
had
heard
all
that
before
.
And
all
he
said
--
that
it
was
necessary
to
await
provisions
,
or
that
the
men
had
no
boots
--
was
so
simple
,
while
what
they
proposed
was
so
complicated
and
clever
,
that
it
was
evident
that
he
was
old
and
stupid
and
that
they
,
though
not
in
power
,
were
commanders
of
genius
.
After
the
junction
with
the
army
of
the
brilliant
admiral
and
Petersburg
hero
Wittgenstein
,
this
mood
and
the
gossip
of
the
staff
reached
their
maximum
.
Kutúzov
saw
this
and
merely
sighed
and
shrugged
his
shoulders
.
Only
once
,
after
the
affair
of
the
Berëzina
,
did
he
get
angry
and
write
to
Bennigsen
(
who
reported
separately
to
the
Emperor
)
the
following
letter
:
"
On
account
of
your
spells
of
ill
health
,
will
your
excellency
please
be
so
good
as
to
set
off
for
Kalúga
on
receipt
of
this
,
and
there
await
further
commands
and
appointments
from
His
Imperial
Majesty
.
"
