-
Главная
-
- Книги
-
- Авторы
-
- Лев Толстой
-
- Война и мир
-
- Стр. 1137/1273
Для того чтобы воспользоваться озвучкой предложений, необходимо
Войти или зарегистрироваться
Озвучка предложений доступна при наличии PRO-доступа
Купить PRO-доступ
Thirdly
it
was
impossible
,
because
the
military
term
"
to
cut
off
"
has
no
meaning
.
One
can
cut
off
a
slice
of
bread
,
but
not
an
army
.
To
cut
off
an
army
--
to
bar
its
road
--
is
quite
impossible
,
for
there
is
always
plenty
of
room
to
avoid
capture
and
there
is
the
night
when
nothing
can
be
seen
,
as
the
military
scientists
might
convince
themselves
by
the
example
of
Krásnoe
and
of
the
Berëzina
.
It
is
only
possible
to
capture
prisoners
if
they
agree
to
be
captured
,
just
as
it
is
only
possible
to
catch
a
swallow
if
it
settles
on
one
's
hand
.
Men
can
only
be
taken
prisoners
if
they
surrender
according
to
the
rules
of
strategy
and
tactics
,
as
the
Germans
did
.
But
the
French
troops
quite
rightly
did
not
consider
that
this
suited
them
,
since
death
by
hunger
and
cold
awaited
them
in
flight
or
captivity
alike
.
Fourthly
and
chiefly
it
was
impossible
,
because
never
since
the
world
began
has
a
war
been
fought
under
such
conditions
as
those
that
obtained
in
1812
,
and
the
Russian
army
in
its
pursuit
of
the
French
strained
its
strength
to
the
utmost
and
could
not
have
done
more
without
destroying
itself
.
During
the
movement
of
the
Russian
army
from
Tarútino
to
Krásnoe
it
lost
fifty
thousand
sick
or
stragglers
,
that
is
a
number
equal
to
the
population
of
a
large
provincial
town
.
Half
the
men
fell
out
of
the
army
without
a
battle
.
And
it
is
of
this
period
of
the
campaign
--
when
the
army
lacked
boots
and
sheepskin
coats
,
was
short
of
provisions
and
without
vodka
,
and
was
camping
out
at
night
for
months
in
the
snow
with
fifteen
degrees
of
frost
,
when
there
were
only
seven
or
eight
hours
of
daylight
and
the
rest
was
night
in
which
the
influence
of
discipline
can
not
be
maintained
,
when
men
were
taken
into
that
region
of
death
where
discipline
fails
,
not
for
a
few
hours
only
as
in
a
battle
,
but
for
months
,
where
they
were
every
moment
fighting
death
from
hunger
and
cold
,
when
half
the
army
perished
in
a
single
month
--
it
is
of
this
period
of
the
campaign
that
the
historians
tell
us
how
Milorádovich
should
have
made
a
flank
march
to
such
and
such
a
place
,
Tormásov
to
another
place
,
and
Chichagóv
should
have
crossed
(
more
than
knee-deep
in
snow
)
to
somewhere
else
,
and
how
so-and-so
"
routed
"
and
"
cut
off
"
the
French
and
so
on
and
so
on
.
The
Russians
,
half
of
whom
died
,
did
all
that
could
and
should
have
been
done
to
attain
an
end
worthy
of
the
nation
,
and
they
are
not
to
blame
because
other
Russians
,
sitting
in
warm
rooms
,
proposed
that
they
should
do
what
was
impossible
.
All
that
strange
contradiction
now
difficult
to
understand
between
the
facts
and
the
historical
accounts
only
arises
because
the
historians
dealing
with
the
matter
have
written
the
history
of
the
beautiful
words
and
sentiments
of
various
generals
,
and
not
the
history
of
the
events
To
them
the
words
of
Milorádovich
seem
very
interesting
,
and
so
do
their
surmises
and
the
rewards
this
or
that
general
received
;
but
the
question
of
those
fifty
thousand
men
who
were
left
in
hospitals
and
in
graves
does
not
even
interest
them
,
for
it
does
not
come
within
the
range
of
their
investigation
.
Yet
one
need
only
discard
the
study
of
the
reports
and
general
plans
and
consider
the
movement
of
those
hundreds
of
thousands
of
men
who
took
a
direct
part
in
the
events
,
and
all
the
questions
that
seemed
insoluble
easily
and
simply
receive
an
immediate
and
certain
solution
.
The
aim
of
cutting
off
Napoleon
and
his
army
never
existed
except
in
the
imaginations
of
a
dozen
people
.
It
could
not
exist
because
it
was
senseless
and
unattainable
.
