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- Стр. 1135/1273
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What
Russian
,
reading
the
account
of
the
last
part
of
the
campaign
of
1812
,
has
not
experienced
an
uncomfortable
feeling
of
regret
,
dissatisfaction
,
and
perplexity
?
Who
has
not
asked
himself
how
it
is
that
the
French
were
not
all
captured
or
destroyed
when
our
three
armies
surrounded
them
in
superior
numbers
,
when
the
disordered
French
,
hungry
and
freezing
,
surrendered
in
crowds
,
and
when
(
as
the
historians
relate
)
the
aim
of
the
Russians
was
to
stop
the
French
,
to
cut
them
off
,
and
capture
them
all
?
How
was
it
that
the
Russian
army
,
which
when
numerically
weaker
than
the
French
had
given
battle
at
Borodinó
,
did
not
achieve
its
purpose
when
it
had
surrounded
the
French
on
three
sides
and
when
its
aim
was
to
capture
them
?
Can
the
French
be
so
enormously
superior
to
us
that
when
we
had
surrounded
them
with
superior
forces
we
could
not
beat
them
?
How
could
that
happen
?
History
(
or
what
is
called
by
that
name
)
replying
to
these
questions
says
that
this
occurred
because
Kutúzov
and
Tormásov
and
Chichagóv
,
and
this
man
and
that
man
,
did
not
execute
such
and
such
maneuvers
...
But
why
did
they
not
execute
those
maneuvers
?
And
why
if
they
were
guilty
of
not
carrying
out
a
prearranged
plan
were
they
not
tried
and
punished
?
But
even
if
we
admitted
that
Kutúzov
,
Chichagóv
,
and
others
were
the
cause
of
the
Russian
failures
,
it
is
still
incomprehensible
why
,
the
position
of
the
Russian
army
being
what
it
was
at
Krásnoe
and
at
the
Berëzina
(
in
both
cases
we
had
superior
forces
)
,
the
French
army
with
its
marshals
,
kings
,
and
Emperor
was
not
captured
,
if
that
was
what
the
Russians
aimed
at
.
The
explanation
of
this
strange
fact
given
by
Russian
military
historians
(
to
the
effect
that
Kutúzov
hindered
an
attack
)
is
unfounded
,
for
we
know
that
he
could
not
restrain
the
troops
from
attacking
at
Vyázma
and
Tarútino
.
Why
was
the
Russian
army
--
which
with
inferior
forces
had
withstood
the
enemy
in
full
strength
at
Borodinó
--
defeated
at
Krásnoe
and
the
Berëzina
by
the
disorganized
crowds
of
the
French
when
it
was
numerically
superior
?
If
the
aim
of
the
Russians
consisted
in
cutting
off
and
capturing
Napoleon
and
his
marshals
--
and
that
aim
was
not
merely
frustrated
but
all
attempts
to
attain
it
were
most
shamefully
baffled
--
then
this
last
period
of
the
campaign
is
quite
rightly
considered
by
the
French
to
be
a
series
of
victories
,
and
quite
wrongly
considered
victorious
by
Russian
historians
.
The
Russian
military
historians
in
so
far
as
they
submit
to
claims
of
logic
must
admit
that
conclusion
,
and
in
spite
of
their
lyrical
rhapsodies
about
valor
,
devotion
,
and
so
forth
,
must
reluctantly
admit
that
the
French
retreat
from
Moscow
was
a
series
of
victories
for
Napoleon
and
defeats
for
Kutúzov
.
But
putting
national
vanity
entirely
aside
one
feels
that
such
a
conclusion
involves
a
contradiction
,
since
the
series
of
French
victories
brought
the
French
complete
destruction
,
while
the
series
of
Russian
defeats
led
to
the
total
destruction
of
their
enemy
and
the
liberation
of
their
country
.
The
source
of
this
contradiction
lies
in
the
fact
that
the
historians
studying
the
events
from
the
letters
of
the
sovereigns
and
the
generals
,
from
memoirs
,
reports
,
projects
,
and
so
forth
,
have
attributed
to
this
last
period
of
the
war
of
1812
an
aim
that
never
existed
,
namely
that
of
cutting
off
and
capturing
Napoleon
with
his
marshals
and
his
army
.
