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That
unknown
quantity
is
the
spirit
of
the
army
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
greater
or
lesser
readiness
to
fight
and
face
danger
felt
by
all
the
men
composing
an
army
,
quite
independently
of
whether
they
are
,
or
are
not
,
fighting
under
the
command
of
a
genius
,
in
two
--
or
three-line
formation
,
with
cudgels
or
with
rifles
that
repeat
thirty
times
a
minute
.
Men
who
want
to
fight
will
always
put
themselves
in
the
most
advantageous
conditions
for
fighting
.
The
spirit
of
an
army
is
the
factor
which
multiplied
by
the
mass
gives
the
resulting
force
.
To
define
and
express
the
significance
of
this
unknown
factor
--
the
spirit
of
an
army
--
is
a
problem
for
science
.
This
problem
is
only
solvable
if
we
cease
arbitrarily
to
substitute
for
the
unknown
x
itself
the
conditions
under
which
that
force
becomes
apparent
--
such
as
the
commands
of
the
general
,
the
equipment
employed
,
and
so
on
--
mistaking
these
for
the
real
significance
of
the
factor
,
and
if
we
recognize
this
unknown
quantity
in
its
entirety
as
being
the
greater
or
lesser
desire
to
fight
and
to
face
danger
.
Only
then
,
expressing
known
historic
facts
by
equations
and
comparing
the
relative
significance
of
this
factor
,
can
we
hope
to
define
the
unknown
.
Ten
men
,
battalions
,
or
divisions
,
fighting
fifteen
men
,
battalions
,
or
divisions
,
conquer
--
that
is
,
kill
or
take
captive
--
all
the
others
,
while
themselves
losing
four
,
so
that
on
the
one
side
four
and
on
the
other
fifteen
were
lost
.
Consequently
the
four
were
equal
to
the
fifteen
,
and
therefore
4x
=
15y
.
Consequently
x/y
=
15/4
.
This
equation
does
not
give
us
the
value
of
the
unknown
factor
but
gives
us
a
ratio
between
two
unknowns
.
And
by
bringing
variously
selected
historic
units
(
battles
,
campaigns
,
periods
of
war
)
into
such
equations
,
a
series
of
numbers
could
be
obtained
in
which
certain
laws
should
exist
and
might
be
discovered
.
The
tactical
rule
that
an
army
should
act
in
masses
when
attacking
,
and
in
smaller
groups
in
retreat
,
unconsciously
confirms
the
truth
that
the
strength
of
an
army
depends
on
its
spirit
.
To
lead
men
forward
under
fire
more
discipline
(
obtainable
only
by
movement
in
masses
)
is
needed
than
is
needed
to
resist
attacks
But
this
rule
which
leaves
out
of
account
the
spirit
of
the
army
continually
proves
incorrect
and
is
in
particularly
striking
contrast
to
the
facts
when
some
strong
rise
or
fall
in
the
spirit
of
the
troops
occurs
,
as
in
all
national
wars
.
The
French
,
retreating
in
1812
--
though
according
to
tactics
they
should
have
separated
into
detachments
to
defend
themselves
--
congregated
into
a
mass
because
the
spirit
of
the
army
had
so
fallen
that
only
the
mass
held
the
army
together
.
The
Russians
,
on
the
contrary
,
ought
according
to
tactics
to
have
attacked
in
mass
,
but
in
fact
they
split
up
into
small
units
,
because
their
spirit
had
so
risen
that
separate
individuals
,
without
orders
,
dealt
blows
at
the
French
without
needing
any
compulsion
to
induce
them
to
expose
themselves
to
hardships
and
dangers
.
The
so-called
partisan
war
began
with
the
entry
of
the
French
into
Smolénsk
.
Before
partisan
warfare
had
been
officially
recognized
by
the
government
,
thousands
of
enemy
stragglers
,
marauders
,
and
foragers
had
been
destroyed
by
the
Cossacks
and
the
peasants
,
who
killed
them
off
as
instinctively
as
dogs
worry
a
stray
mad
dog
to
death
.
Denís
Davýdov
,
with
his
Russian
instinct
,
was
the
first
to
recognize
the
value
of
this
terrible
cudgel
which
regardless
of
the
rules
of
military
science
destroyed
the
French
,
and
to
him
belongs
the
credit
for
taking
the
first
step
toward
regularizing
this
method
of
warfare
.
On
August
24
Davýdov
's
first
partisan
detachment
was
formed
and
then
others
were
recognized
.
The
further
the
campaign
progressed
the
more
numerous
these
detachments
became
.
