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- Стр. 1092/1273
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One
of
the
most
obvious
and
advantageous
departures
from
the
so-called
laws
of
war
is
the
action
of
scattered
groups
against
men
pressed
together
in
a
mass
.
Such
action
always
occurs
in
wars
that
take
on
a
national
character
.
In
such
actions
,
instead
of
two
crowds
opposing
each
other
,
the
men
disperse
,
attack
singly
,
run
away
when
attacked
by
stronger
forces
,
but
again
attack
when
opportunity
offers
.
This
was
done
by
the
guerrillas
in
Spain
,
by
the
mountain
tribes
in
the
Caucasus
,
and
by
the
Russians
in
1812
.
People
have
called
this
kind
of
war
"
guerrilla
warfare
"
and
assume
that
by
so
calling
it
they
have
explained
its
meaning
.
But
such
a
war
does
not
fit
in
under
any
rule
and
is
directly
opposed
to
a
well-known
rule
of
tactics
which
is
accepted
as
infallible
.
That
rule
says
that
an
attacker
should
concentrate
his
forces
in
order
to
be
stronger
than
his
opponent
at
the
moment
of
conflict
.
Guerrilla
war
(
always
successful
,
as
history
shows
)
directly
infringes
that
rule
.
This
contradiction
arises
from
the
fact
that
military
science
assumes
the
strength
of
an
army
to
be
identical
with
its
numbers
.
Military
science
says
that
the
more
troops
the
greater
the
strength
.
Les
gros
bataillons
ont
toujours
raison
.
*
*
Large
battalions
are
always
victorious
.
For
military
science
to
say
this
is
like
defining
momentum
in
mechanics
by
reference
to
the
mass
only
:
stating
that
momenta
are
equal
or
unequal
to
each
other
simply
because
the
masses
involved
are
equal
or
unequal
.
Momentum
(
quantity
of
motion
)
is
the
product
of
mass
and
velocity
.
In
military
affairs
the
strength
of
an
army
is
the
product
of
its
mass
and
some
unknown
x.
Military
science
,
seeing
in
history
innumerable
instances
of
the
fact
that
the
size
of
any
army
does
not
coincide
with
its
strength
and
that
small
detachments
defeat
larger
ones
,
obscurely
admits
the
existence
of
this
unknown
factor
and
tries
to
discover
it
--
now
in
a
geometric
formation
,
now
in
the
equipment
employed
,
now
,
and
most
usually
,
in
the
genius
of
the
commanders
.
But
the
assignment
of
these
various
meanings
to
the
factor
does
not
yield
results
which
accord
with
the
historic
facts
.
Yet
it
is
only
necessary
to
abandon
the
false
view
(
adopted
to
gratify
the
"
heroes
"
)
of
the
efficacy
of
the
directions
issued
in
wartime
by
commanders
,
in
order
to
find
this
unknown
quantity
.
