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Napoleon
's
historians
describe
to
us
his
skilled
maneuvers
at
Tarútino
and
Málo-Yaroslávets
,
and
make
conjectures
as
to
what
would
have
happened
had
Napoleon
been
in
time
to
penetrate
into
the
rich
southern
provinces
.
But
not
to
speak
of
the
fact
that
nothing
prevented
him
from
advancing
into
those
southern
provinces
(
for
the
Russian
army
did
not
bar
his
way
)
,
the
historians
forget
that
nothing
could
have
saved
his
army
,
for
then
already
it
bore
within
itself
the
germs
of
inevitable
ruin
.
How
could
that
army
--
which
had
found
abundant
supplies
in
Moscow
and
had
trampled
them
underfoot
instead
of
keeping
them
,
and
on
arriving
at
Smolénsk
had
looted
provisions
instead
of
storing
them
--
how
could
that
army
recuperate
in
Kalúga
province
,
which
was
inhabited
by
Russians
such
as
those
who
lived
in
Moscow
,
and
where
fire
had
the
same
property
of
consuming
what
was
set
ablaze
?
That
army
could
not
recover
anywhere
.
Since
the
battle
of
Borodinó
and
the
pillage
of
Moscow
it
had
borne
within
itself
,
as
it
were
,
the
chemical
elements
of
dissolution
.
The
members
of
what
had
once
been
an
army
--
Napoleon
himself
and
all
his
soldiers
--
fled
without
knowing
whither
,
each
concerned
only
to
make
his
escape
as
quickly
as
possible
from
this
position
,
of
the
hopelessness
of
which
they
were
all
more
or
less
vaguely
conscious
.
So
it
came
about
that
at
the
council
at
Málo-Yaroslávets
,
when
the
generals
pretending
to
confer
together
expressed
various
opinions
,
all
mouths
were
closed
by
the
opinion
uttered
by
the
simple-minded
soldier
Mouton
who
,
speaking
last
,
said
what
they
all
felt
:
that
the
one
thing
needful
was
to
get
away
as
quickly
as
possible
;
and
no
one
,
not
even
Napoleon
,
could
say
anything
against
that
truth
which
they
all
recognized
.
But
though
they
all
realized
that
it
was
necessary
to
get
away
,
there
still
remained
a
feeling
of
shame
at
admitting
that
they
must
flee
.
An
external
shock
was
needed
to
overcome
that
shame
,
and
this
shock
came
in
due
time
.
It
was
what
the
French
called
"
le
hourra
de
l'Empereur
.
"
The
day
after
the
council
at
Málo-Yaroslávets
Napoleon
rode
out
early
in
the
morning
amid
the
lines
of
his
army
with
his
suite
of
marshals
and
an
escort
,
on
the
pretext
of
inspecting
the
army
and
the
scene
of
the
previous
and
of
the
impending
battle
.
Some
Cossacks
on
the
prowl
for
booty
fell
in
with
the
Emperor
and
very
nearly
captured
him
.
If
the
Cossacks
did
not
capture
Napoleon
then
,
what
saved
him
was
the
very
thing
that
was
destroying
the
French
army
,
the
booty
on
which
the
Cossacks
fell
.
Here
as
at
Tarútino
they
went
after
plunder
,
leaving
the
men
.
Disregarding
Napoleon
they
rushed
after
the
plunder
and
Napoleon
managed
to
escape
When
les
enfants
du
Don
might
so
easily
have
taken
the
Emperor
himself
in
the
midst
of
his
army
,
it
was
clear
that
there
was
nothing
for
it
but
to
fly
as
fast
as
possible
along
the
nearest
,
familiar
road
.
Napoleon
with
his
forty-year-old
stomach
understood
that
hint
,
not
feeling
his
former
agility
and
boldness
,
and
under
the
influence
of
the
fright
the
Cossacks
had
given
him
he
at
once
agreed
with
Mouton
and
issued
orders
--
as
the
historians
tell
us
--
to
retreat
by
the
Smolénsk
road
.
That
Napoleon
agreed
with
Mouton
,
and
that
the
army
retreated
,
does
not
prove
that
Napoleon
caused
it
to
retreat
,
but
that
the
forces
which
influenced
the
whole
army
and
directed
it
along
the
Mozháysk
(
that
is
,
the
Smolénsk
)
road
acted
simultaneously
on
him
also
.
A
man
in
motion
always
devises
an
aim
for
that
motion
.
To
be
able
to
go
a
thousand
miles
he
must
imagine
that
something
good
awaits
him
at
the
end
of
those
thousand
miles
.
One
must
have
the
prospect
of
a
promised
land
to
have
the
strength
to
move
.
