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With
a
minimum
of
effort
and
insignificant
losses
,
despite
the
greatest
confusion
,
the
most
important
results
of
the
whole
campaign
were
attained
:
the
transition
from
retreat
to
advance
,
an
exposure
of
the
weakness
of
the
French
,
and
the
administration
of
that
shock
which
Napoleon
's
army
had
only
awaited
to
begin
its
flight
.
Napoleon
enters
Moscow
after
the
brilliant
victory
de
la
Moskowa
;
there
can
be
no
doubt
about
the
victory
for
the
battlefield
remains
in
the
hands
of
the
French
.
The
Russians
retreat
and
abandon
their
ancient
capital
.
Moscow
,
abounding
in
provisions
,
arms
,
munitions
,
and
incalculable
wealth
,
is
in
Napoleon
's
hands
.
The
Russian
army
,
only
half
the
strength
of
the
French
,
does
not
make
a
single
attempt
to
attack
for
a
whole
month
.
Napoleon
's
position
is
most
brilliant
.
He
can
either
fall
on
the
Russian
army
with
double
its
strength
and
destroy
it
;
negotiate
an
advantageous
peace
,
or
in
case
of
a
refusal
make
a
menacing
move
on
Petersburg
,
or
even
,
in
the
case
of
a
reverse
,
return
to
Smolénsk
or
Vílna
;
or
remain
in
Moscow
;
in
short
,
no
special
genius
would
seem
to
be
required
to
retain
the
brilliant
position
the
French
held
at
that
time
.
For
that
,
only
very
simple
and
easy
steps
were
necessary
:
not
to
allow
the
troops
to
loot
,
to
prepare
winter
clothing
--
of
which
there
was
sufficient
in
Moscow
for
the
whole
army
--
and
methodically
to
collect
the
provisions
,
of
which
(
according
to
the
French
historians
)
there
were
enough
in
Moscow
to
supply
the
whole
army
for
six
months
.
Yet
Napoleon
,
that
greatest
of
all
geniuses
,
who
the
historians
declare
had
control
of
the
army
,
took
none
of
these
steps
.
He
not
merely
did
nothing
of
the
kind
,
but
on
the
contrary
he
used
his
power
to
select
the
most
foolish
and
ruinous
of
all
the
courses
open
to
him
.
Of
all
that
Napoleon
might
have
done
:
wintering
in
Moscow
,
advancing
on
Petersburg
or
on
Nízhni-Nóvgorod
,
or
retiring
by
a
more
northerly
or
more
southerly
route
(
say
by
the
road
Kutúzov
afterwards
took
)
,
nothing
more
stupid
or
disastrous
can
be
imagined
than
what
he
actually
did
.
He
remained
in
Moscow
till
October
,
letting
the
troops
plunder
the
city
;
then
,
hesitating
whether
to
leave
a
garrison
behind
him
,
he
quitted
Moscow
,
approached
Kutúzov
without
joining
battle
,
turned
to
the
right
and
reached
Málo-Yaroslávets
,
again
without
attempting
to
break
through
and
take
the
road
Kutúzov
took
,
but
retiring
instead
to
Mozháysk
along
the
devastated
Smolénsk
road
.
Nothing
more
stupid
than
that
could
have
been
devised
,
or
more
disastrous
for
the
army
,
as
the
sequel
showed
.
Had
Napoleon
's
aim
been
to
destroy
his
army
,
the
most
skillful
strategist
could
hardly
have
devised
any
series
of
actions
that
would
so
completely
have
accomplished
that
purpose
,
independently
of
anything
the
Russian
army
might
do
.
Napoleon
,
the
man
of
genius
,
did
this
!
But
to
say
that
he
destroyed
his
army
because
he
wished
to
,
or
because
he
was
very
stupid
,
would
be
as
unjust
as
to
say
that
he
had
brought
his
troops
to
Moscow
because
he
wished
to
and
because
he
was
very
clever
and
a
genius
.
In
both
cases
his
personal
activity
,
having
no
more
force
than
the
personal
activity
of
any
soldier
,
merely
coincided
with
the
laws
that
guided
the
event
.
The
historians
quite
falsely
represent
Napoleon
's
faculties
as
having
weakened
in
Moscow
,
and
do
so
only
because
the
results
did
not
justify
his
actions
He
employed
all
his
ability
and
strength
to
do
the
best
he
could
for
himself
and
his
army
,
as
he
had
done
previously
and
as
he
did
subsequently
in
1813
.
His
activity
at
that
time
was
no
less
astounding
than
it
was
in
Egypt
,
in
Italy
,
in
Austria
,
and
in
Prussia
.
We
do
not
know
for
certain
in
how
far
his
genius
was
genuine
in
Egypt
--
where
forty
centuries
looked
down
upon
his
grandeur
--
for
his
great
exploits
there
are
all
told
us
by
Frenchmen
.
We
can
not
accurately
estimate
his
genius
in
Austria
or
Prussia
,
for
we
have
to
draw
our
information
from
French
or
German
sources
,
and
the
incomprehensible
surrender
of
whole
corps
without
fighting
and
of
fortresses
without
a
siege
must
incline
Germans
to
recognize
his
genius
as
the
only
explanation
of
the
war
carried
on
in
Germany
.
But
we
,
thank
God
,
have
no
need
to
recognize
his
genius
in
order
to
hide
our
shame
.
We
have
paid
for
the
right
to
look
at
the
matter
plainly
and
simply
,
and
we
will
not
abandon
that
right
.
His
activity
in
Moscow
was
as
amazing
and
as
full
of
genius
as
elsewhere
.
Order
after
order
and
plan
after
plan
were
issued
by
him
from
the
time
he
entered
Moscow
till
the
time
he
left
it
.
The
absence
of
citizens
and
of
a
deputation
,
and
even
the
burning
of
Moscow
,
did
not
disconcert
him
.
He
did
not
lose
sight
either
of
the
welfare
of
his
army
or
of
the
doings
of
the
enemy
,
or
of
the
welfare
of
the
people
of
Russia
,
or
of
the
direction
of
affairs
in
Paris
,
or
of
diplomatic
considerations
concerning
the
terms
of
the
anticipated
peace
.
With
regard
to
military
matters
,
Napoleon
immediately
on
his
entry
into
Moscow
gave
General
Sabastiani
strict
orders
to
observe
the
movements
of
the
Russian
army
,
sent
army
corps
out
along
the
different
roads
,
and
charged
Murat
to
find
Kutúzov
.
Then
he
gave
careful
directions
about
the
fortification
of
the
Krémlin
,
and
drew
up
a
brilliant
plan
for
a
future
campaign
over
the
whole
map
of
Russia
.
