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- Стр. 1054/1273
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Little
Nicholas
cried
because
his
heart
was
rent
by
painful
perplexity
.
The
countess
and
Sónya
cried
from
pity
for
Natásha
and
because
he
was
no
more
.
The
old
count
cried
because
he
felt
that
before
long
,
he
,
too
,
must
take
the
same
terrible
step
.
Natásha
and
Princess
Mary
also
wept
now
,
but
not
because
of
their
own
personal
grief
;
they
wept
with
a
reverent
and
softening
emotion
which
had
taken
possession
of
their
souls
at
the
consciousness
of
the
simple
and
solemn
mystery
of
death
that
had
been
accomplished
in
their
presence
.
Man
's
mind
can
not
grasp
the
causes
of
events
in
their
completeness
,
but
the
desire
to
find
those
causes
is
implanted
in
man
's
soul
.
And
without
considering
the
multiplicity
and
complexity
of
the
conditions
any
one
of
which
taken
separately
may
seem
to
be
the
cause
,
he
snatches
at
the
first
approximation
to
a
cause
that
seems
to
him
intelligible
and
says
:
"
This
is
the
cause
!
"
In
historical
events
(
where
the
actions
of
men
are
the
subject
of
observation
)
the
first
and
most
primitive
approximation
to
present
itself
was
the
will
of
the
gods
and
,
after
that
,
the
will
of
those
who
stood
in
the
most
prominent
position
--
the
heroes
of
history
.
But
we
need
only
penetrate
to
the
essence
of
any
historic
event
--
which
lies
in
the
activity
of
the
general
mass
of
men
who
take
part
in
it
--
to
be
convinced
that
the
will
of
the
historic
hero
does
not
control
the
actions
of
the
mass
but
is
itself
continually
controlled
.
It
may
seem
to
be
a
matter
of
indifference
whether
we
understand
the
meaning
of
historical
events
this
way
or
that
;
yet
there
is
the
same
difference
between
a
man
who
says
that
the
people
of
the
West
moved
on
the
East
because
Napoleon
wished
it
and
a
man
who
says
that
this
happened
because
it
had
to
happen
,
as
there
is
between
those
who
declared
that
the
earth
was
stationary
and
that
the
planets
moved
round
it
and
those
who
admitted
that
they
did
not
know
what
upheld
the
earth
,
but
knew
there
were
laws
directing
its
movement
and
that
of
the
other
planets
.
There
is
,
and
can
be
,
no
cause
of
an
historical
event
except
the
one
cause
of
all
causes
.
But
there
are
laws
directing
events
,
and
some
of
these
laws
are
known
to
us
while
we
are
conscious
of
others
we
can
not
comprehend
.
The
discovery
of
these
laws
is
only
possible
when
we
have
quite
abandoned
the
attempt
to
find
the
cause
in
the
will
of
some
one
man
,
just
as
the
discovery
of
the
laws
of
the
motion
of
the
planets
was
possible
only
when
men
abandoned
the
conception
of
the
fixity
of
the
earth
.
The
historians
consider
that
,
next
to
the
battle
of
Borodinó
and
the
occupation
of
Moscow
by
the
enemy
and
its
destruction
by
fire
,
the
most
important
episode
of
the
war
of
1812
was
the
movement
of
the
Russian
army
from
the
Ryazána
to
the
Kalúga
road
and
to
the
Tarútino
camp
--
the
so-called
flank
march
across
the
Krásnaya
Pakhrá
River
.
They
ascribe
the
glory
of
that
achievement
of
genius
to
different
men
and
dispute
as
to
whom
the
honor
is
due
.
Even
foreign
historians
,
including
the
French
,
acknowledge
the
genius
of
the
Russian
commanders
when
they
speak
of
that
flank
march
.
But
it
is
hard
to
understand
why
military
writers
,
and
following
them
others
,
consider
this
flank
march
to
be
the
profound
conception
of
some
one
man
who
saved
Russia
and
destroyed
Napoleon
.
In
the
first
place
it
is
hard
to
understand
where
the
profundity
and
genius
of
this
movement
lay
,
for
not
much
mental
effort
was
needed
to
see
that
the
best
position
for
an
army
when
it
is
not
being
attacked
is
where
there
are
most
provisions
;
and
even
a
dull
boy
of
thirteen
could
have
guessed
that
the
best
position
for
an
army
after
its
retreat
from
Moscow
in
1812
was
on
the
Kalúga
road
.
So
it
is
impossible
to
understand
by
what
reasoning
the
historians
reach
the
conclusion
that
this
maneuver
was
a
profound
one
.
And
it
is
even
more
difficult
to
understand
just
why
they
think
that
this
maneuver
was
calculated
to
save
Russia
and
destroy
the
French
;
for
this
flank
march
,
had
it
been
preceded
,
accompanied
,
or
followed
by
other
circumstances
,
might
have
proved
ruinous
to
the
Russians
and
salutary
for
the
French
.
If
the
position
of
the
Russian
army
really
began
to
improve
from
the
time
of
that
march
,
it
does
not
at
all
follow
that
the
march
was
the
cause
of
it
.
That
flank
march
might
not
only
have
failed
to
give
any
advantage
to
the
Russian
army
,
but
might
in
other
circumstances
have
led
to
its
destruction
.
What
would
have
happened
had
Moscow
not
burned
down
?
If
Murat
had
not
lost
sight
of
the
Russians
?
If
Napoleon
had
not
remained
inactive
?
If
the
Russian
army
at
Krásnaya
Pakhrá
had
given
battle
as
Bennigsen
and
Barclay
advised
?
What
would
have
happened
had
the
French
attacked
the
Russians
while
they
were
marching
beyond
the
Pakhrá
?
What
would
have
happened
if
on
approaching
Tarútino
,
Napoleon
had
attacked
the
Russians
with
but
a
tenth
of
the
energy
he
had
shown
when
he
attacked
them
at
Smolénsk
?
What
would
have
happened
had
the
French
moved
on
Petersburg
?
...
In
any
of
these
eventualities
the
flank
march
that
brought
salvation
might
have
proved
disastrous
.
The
third
and
most
incomprehensible
thing
is
that
people
studying
history
deliberately
avoid
seeing
that
this
flank
march
can
not
be
attributed
to
any
one
man
,
that
no
one
ever
foresaw
it
,
and
that
in
reality
,
like
the
retreat
from
Filí
,
it
did
not
suggest
itself
to
anyone
in
its
entirety
,
but
resulted
--
moment
by
moment
,
step
by
step
,
event
by
event
--
from
an
endless
number
of
most
diverse
circumstances
and
was
only
seen
in
its
entirety
when
it
had
been
accomplished
and
belonged
to
the
past
.
At
the
council
at
Filí
the
prevailing
thought
in
the
minds
of
the
Russian
commanders
was
the
one
naturally
suggesting
itself
,
namely
,
a
direct
retreat
by
the
Nízhni
road
.
In
proof
of
this
there
is
the
fact
that
the
majority
of
the
council
voted
for
such
a
retreat
,
and
above
all
there
is
the
well-known
conversation
after
the
council
,
between
the
commander
in
chief
and
Lanskóy
,
who
was
in
charge
of
the
commissariat
department
.
Lanskóy
informed
the
commander
in
chief
that
the
army
supplies
were
for
the
most
part
stored
along
the
Oká
in
the
Túla
and
Ryazán
provinces
,
and
that
if
they
retreated
on
Nízhni
the
army
would
be
separated
from
its
supplies
by
the
broad
river
Oká
,
which
can
not
be
crossed
early
in
winter
.
This
was
the
first
indication
of
the
necessity
of
deviating
from
what
had
previously
seemed
the
most
natural
course
--
a
direct
retreat
on
Nízhni-Nóvgorod
.
The
army
turned
more
to
the
south
,
along
the
Ryazán
road
and
nearer
to
its
supplies
Subsequently
the
inactivity
of
the
French
(
who
even
lost
sight
of
the
Russian
army
)
,
concern
for
the
safety
of
the
arsenal
at
Túla
,
and
especially
the
advantages
of
drawing
nearer
to
its
supplies
caused
the
army
to
turn
still
further
south
to
the
Túla
road
.
Having
crossed
over
,
by
a
forced
march
,
to
the
Túla
road
beyond
the
Pakhrá
,
the
Russian
commanders
intended
to
remain
at
Podólsk
and
had
no
thought
of
the
Tarútino
position
;
but
innumerable
circumstances
and
the
reappearance
of
French
troops
who
had
for
a
time
lost
touch
with
the
Russians
,
and
projects
of
giving
battle
,
and
above
all
the
abundance
of
provisions
in
Kalúga
province
,
obliged
our
army
to
turn
still
more
to
the
south
and
to
cross
from
the
Túla
to
the
Kalúga
road
and
go
to
Tarútino
,
which
was
between
the
roads
along
which
those
supplies
lay
.
Just
as
it
is
impossible
to
say
when
it
was
decided
to
abandon
Moscow
,
so
it
is
impossible
to
say
precisely
when
,
or
by
whom
,
it
was
decided
to
move
to
Tarútino
.
Only
when
the
army
had
got
there
,
as
the
result
of
innumerable
and
varying
forces
,
did
people
begin
to
assure
themselves
that
they
had
desired
this
movement
and
long
ago
foreseen
its
result
.
