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- Теодор Драйзер
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- Стр. 61/297
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He
knew
little
of
finance
,
but
was
an
excellent
bookkeeper
;
and
,
anyhow
,
was
not
corporation
counsel
Regan
,
another
political
tool
of
this
great
triumvirate
,
there
to
advise
him
at
all
times
?
He
was
.
It
was
a
very
simple
matter
.
Being
put
on
the
ticket
was
equivalent
to
being
elected
,
and
so
,
after
a
few
weeks
of
exceedingly
trying
platform
experiences
,
in
which
he
had
stammered
through
platitudinous
declarations
that
the
city
needed
to
be
honestly
administered
,
he
was
inducted
into
office
;
and
there
you
were
.
Now
it
would
n't
have
made
so
much
difference
what
George
W.
Stener
's
executive
and
financial
qualifications
for
the
position
were
,
but
at
this
time
the
city
of
Philadelphia
was
still
hobbling
along
under
perhaps
as
evil
a
financial
system
,
or
lack
of
it
,
as
any
city
ever
endured
--
the
assessor
and
the
treasurer
being
allowed
to
collect
and
hold
moneys
belonging
to
the
city
,
outside
of
the
city
's
private
vaults
,
and
that
without
any
demand
on
the
part
of
anybody
that
the
same
be
invested
by
them
at
interest
for
the
city
's
benefit
.
Rather
,
all
they
were
expected
to
do
,
apparently
,
was
to
restore
the
principal
and
that
which
was
with
them
when
they
entered
or
left
office
.
It
was
not
understood
or
publicly
demanded
that
the
moneys
so
collected
,
or
drawn
from
any
source
,
be
maintained
intact
in
the
vaults
of
the
city
treasury
.
They
could
be
loaned
out
,
deposited
in
banks
or
used
to
further
private
interests
of
any
one
,
so
long
as
the
principal
was
returned
,
and
no
one
was
the
wiser
.
Of
course
,
this
theory
of
finance
was
not
publicly
sanctioned
,
but
it
was
known
politically
and
journalistically
,
and
in
high
finance
.
How
were
you
to
stop
it
?
Cowperwood
,
in
approaching
Edward
Malia
Butler
,
had
been
unconsciously
let
in
on
this
atmosphere
of
erratic
and
unsatisfactory
speculation
without
really
knowing
it
.
When
he
had
left
the
office
of
Tighe
&
Co.
,
seven
years
before
,
it
was
with
the
idea
that
henceforth
and
forever
he
would
have
nothing
to
do
with
the
stock-brokerage
proposition
;
but
now
behold
him
back
in
it
again
,
with
more
vim
than
he
had
ever
displayed
,
for
now
he
was
working
for
himself
,
the
firm
of
Cowperwood
&
Co.
,
and
he
was
eager
to
satisfy
the
world
of
new
and
powerful
individuals
who
by
degrees
were
drifting
to
him
.
All
had
a
little
money
.
All
had
tips
,
and
they
wanted
him
to
carry
certain
lines
of
stock
on
margin
for
them
,
because
he
was
known
to
other
political
men
,
and
because
he
was
safe
.
And
this
was
true
.
He
was
not
,
or
at
least
up
to
this
time
had
not
been
,
a
speculator
or
a
gambler
on
his
own
account
.
In
fact
he
often
soothed
himself
with
the
thought
that
in
all
these
years
he
had
never
gambled
for
himself
,
but
had
always
acted
strictly
for
others
instead
.
But
now
here
was
George
W.
Stener
with
a
proposition
which
was
not
quite
the
same
thing
as
stock-gambling
,
and
yet
it
was
.
During
a
long
period
of
years
preceding
the
Civil
War
,
and
through
it
,
let
it
here
be
explained
and
remembered
,
the
city
of
Philadelphia
had
been
in
the
habit
,
as
a
corporation
,
when
there
were
no
available
funds
in
the
treasury
,
of
issuing
what
were
known
as
city
warrants
,
which
were
nothing
more
than
notes
or
I.O.U.
'
s
bearing
six
per
cent
.
interest
,
and
payable
sometimes
in
thirty
days
,
sometimes
in
three
,
sometimes
in
six
months
--
all
depending
on
the
amount
and
how
soon
the
city
treasurer
thought
there
would
be
sufficient
money
in
the
treasury
to
take
them
up
and
cancel
them
.
Small
tradesmen
and
large
contractors
were
frequently
paid
in
this
way
;
the
small
tradesman
who
sold
supplies
to
the
city
institutions
,
for
instance
,
being
compelled
to
discount
his
notes
at
the
bank
,
if
he
needed
ready
money
,
usually
for
ninety
cents
on
the
dollar
,
while
the
large
contractor
could
afford
to
hold
his
and
wait
.
It
can
readily
be
seen
that
this
might
well
work
to
the
disadvantage
of
the
small
dealer
and
merchant
,
and
yet
prove
quite
a
fine
thing
for
a
large
contractor
or
note-broker
,
for
the
city
was
sure
to
pay
the
warrants
at
some
time
,
and
six
per
cent
.
interest
was
a
fat
rate
,
considering
the
absolute
security
.
A
banker
or
broker
who
gathered
up
these
things
from
small
tradesmen
at
ninety
cents
on
the
dollar
made
a
fine
thing
of
it
all
around
if
he
could
wait
.
Originally
,
in
all
probability
,
there
was
no
intention
on
the
part
of
the
city
treasurer
to
do
any
one
an
injustice
,
and
it
is
likely
that
there
really
were
no
funds
to
pay
with
at
the
time
.
However
that
may
have
been
,
there
was
later
no
excuse
for
issuing
the
warrants
,
seeing
that
the
city
might
easily
have
been
managed
much
more
economically
.
But
these
warrants
,
as
can
readily
be
imagined
,
had
come
to
be
a
fine
source
of
profit
for
note-brokers
,
bankers
,
political
financiers
,
and
inside
political
manipulators
generally
and
so
they
remained
a
part
of
the
city
's
fiscal
policy
.
There
was
just
one
drawback
to
all
this
.
In
order
to
get
the
full
advantage
of
this
condition
the
large
banker
holding
them
must
be
an
"
inside
banker
,
"
one
close
to
the
political
forces
of
the
city
,
for
if
he
was
not
and
needed
money
and
he
carried
his
warrants
to
the
city
treasurer
,
he
would
find
that
he
could
not
get
cash
for
them
.
But
if
he
transferred
them
to
some
banker
or
note-broker
who
was
close
to
the
political
force
of
the
city
,
it
was
quite
another
matter
.
The
treasury
would
find
means
to
pay
.
Or
,
if
so
desired
by
the
note-broker
or
banker
--
the
right
one
--
notes
which
were
intended
to
be
met
in
three
months
,
and
should
have
been
settled
at
that
time
,
were
extended
to
run
on
years
and
years
,
drawing
interest
at
six
per
cent
.
even
when
the
city
had
ample
funds
to
meet
them
.
Yet
this
meant
,
of
course
,
an
illegal
interest
drain
on
the
city
,
but
that
was
all
right
also
.
"
No
funds
"
could
cover
that
.
The
general
public
did
not
know
.
It
could
not
find
out
.
The
newspapers
were
not
at
all
vigilant
,
being
pro-political
.
There
were
no
persistent
,
enthusiastic
reformers
who
obtained
any
political
credence
.
During
the
war
,
warrants
outstanding
in
this
manner
arose
in
amount
to
much
over
two
million
dollars
,
all
drawing
six
per
cent
.
interest
,
but
then
,
of
course
,
it
began
to
get
a
little
scandalous
.
Besides
,
at
least
some
of
the
investors
began
to
want
their
money
back
.
In
order
,
therefore
,
to
clear
up
this
outstanding
indebtedness
and
make
everything
shipshape
again
,
it
was
decided
that
the
city
must
issue
a
loan
,
say
for
two
million
dollars
--
no
need
to
be
exact
about
the
amount
.
And
this
loan
must
take
the
shape
of
interest-bearing
certificates
of
a
par
value
of
one
hundred
dollars
,
redeemable
in
six
,
twelve
,
or
eighteen
months
,
as
the
case
may
be
.
These
certificates
of
loan
were
then
ostensibly
to
be
sold
in
the
open
market
,
a
sinking-fund
set
aside
for
their
redemption
,
and
the
money
so
obtained
used
to
take
up
the
long-outstanding
warrants
which
were
now
such
a
subject
of
public
comment
.
It
is
obvious
that
this
was
merely
a
case
of
robbing
Peter
to
pay
Paul
.
There
was
no
real
clearing
up
of
the
outstanding
debt
.
It
was
the
intention
of
the
schemers
to
make
it
possible
for
the
financial
politicians
on
the
inside
to
reap
the
same
old
harvest
by
allowing
the
certificates
to
be
sold
to
the
right
parties
for
ninety
or
less
,
setting
up
the
claim
that
there
was
no
market
for
them
,
the
credit
of
the
city
being
bad
.
To
a
certain
extent
this
was
true
.
