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These
dispositions
,
which
are
very
obscure
and
confused
if
one
allows
oneself
to
regard
the
arrangements
without
religious
awe
of
his
genius
,
related
to
Napoleon
's
orders
to
deal
with
four
points
--
four
different
orders
.
Not
one
of
these
was
,
or
could
be
,
carried
out
.
In
the
disposition
it
is
said
first
that
the
batteries
placed
on
the
spot
chosen
by
Napoleon
,
with
the
guns
of
Pernetti
and
Fouché
;
which
were
to
come
in
line
with
them
,
102
guns
in
all
,
were
to
open
fire
and
shower
shells
on
the
Russian
flèches
and
redoubts
.
This
could
not
be
done
,
as
from
the
spots
selected
by
Napoleon
the
projectiles
did
not
carry
to
the
Russian
works
,
and
those
102
guns
shot
into
the
air
until
the
nearest
commander
,
contrary
to
Napoleon
's
instructions
,
moved
them
forward
.
The
second
order
was
that
Poniatowski
,
moving
to
the
village
through
the
wood
,
should
turn
the
Russian
left
flank
.
This
could
not
be
done
and
was
not
done
,
because
Poniatowski
,
advancing
on
the
village
through
the
wood
,
met
Túchkov
there
barring
his
way
,
and
could
not
and
did
not
turn
the
Russian
position
.
The
third
order
was
:
General
Campan
will
move
through
the
wood
to
seize
the
first
fortification
.
General
Campan
's
division
did
not
seize
the
first
fortification
but
was
driven
back
,
for
on
emerging
from
the
wood
it
had
to
reform
under
grapeshot
,
of
which
Napoleon
was
unaware
.
The
fourth
order
was
:
The
vice-King
will
occupy
the
village
(
Borodinó
)
and
cross
by
its
three
bridges
,
advancing
to
the
same
heights
as
Morand
's
and
Gérard
's
divisions
(
for
whose
movements
no
directions
are
given
)
,
which
under
his
leadership
will
be
directed
against
the
redoubt
and
come
into
line
with
the
rest
of
the
forces
As
far
as
one
can
make
out
,
not
so
much
from
this
unintelligible
sentence
as
from
the
attempts
the
vice-King
made
to
execute
the
orders
given
him
,
he
was
to
advance
from
the
left
through
Borodinó
to
the
redoubt
while
the
divisions
of
Morand
and
Gérard
were
to
advance
simultaneously
from
the
front
.
All
this
,
like
the
other
parts
of
the
disposition
,
was
not
and
could
not
be
executed
.
After
passing
through
Borodinó
the
vice-King
was
driven
back
to
the
Kolochá
and
could
get
no
farther
;
while
the
divisions
of
Morand
and
Gérard
did
not
take
the
redoubt
but
were
driven
back
,
and
the
redoubt
was
only
taken
at
the
end
of
the
battle
by
the
cavalry
(
a
thing
probably
unforeseen
and
not
heard
of
by
Napoleon
)
.
So
not
one
of
the
orders
in
the
disposition
was
,
or
could
be
,
executed
.
But
in
the
disposition
it
is
said
that
,
after
the
fight
has
commenced
in
this
manner
,
orders
will
be
given
in
accordance
with
the
enemy
's
movements
,
and
so
it
might
be
supposed
that
all
necessary
arrangements
would
be
made
by
Napoleon
during
the
battle
.
But
this
was
not
and
could
not
be
done
,
for
during
the
whole
battle
Napoleon
was
so
far
away
that
,
as
appeared
later
,
he
could
not
know
the
course
of
the
battle
and
not
one
of
his
orders
during
the
fight
could
be
executed
.
Many
historians
say
that
the
French
did
not
win
the
battle
of
Borodinó
because
Napoleon
had
a
cold
,
and
that
if
he
had
not
had
a
cold
the
orders
he
gave
before
and
during
the
battle
would
have
been
still
more
full
of
genius
and
Russia
would
have
been
lost
and
the
face
of
the
world
have
been
changed
.
To
historians
who
believe
that
Russia
was
shaped
by
the
will
of
one
man
--
Peter
the
Great
--
and
that
France
from
a
republic
became
an
empire
and
French
armies
went
to
Russia
at
the
will
of
one
man
--
Napoleon
--
to
say
that
Russia
remained
a
power
because
Napoleon
had
a
bad
cold
on
the
twenty-fourth
of
August
may
seem
logical
and
convincing
.
If
it
had
depended
on
Napoleon
's
will
to
fight
or
not
to
fight
the
battle
of
Borodinó
,
and
if
this
or
that
other
arrangement
depended
on
his
will
,
then
evidently
a
cold
affecting
the
manifestation
of
his
will
might
have
saved
Russia
,
and
consequently
the
valet
who
omitted
to
bring
Napoleon
his
waterproof
boots
on
the
twenty-fourth
would
have
been
the
savior
of
Russia
.
Along
that
line
of
thought
such
a
deduction
is
indubitable
,
as
indubitable
as
the
deduction
Voltaire
made
in
jest
(
without
knowing
what
he
was
jesting
at
)
when
he
saw
that
the
Massacre
of
St.
Bartholomew
was
due
to
Charles
IX
's
stomach
being
deranged
.
But
to
men
who
do
not
admit
that
Russia
was
formed
by
the
will
of
one
man
,
Peter
I
,
or
that
the
French
Empire
was
formed
and
the
war
with
Russia
begun
by
the
will
of
one
man
,
Napoleon
,
that
argument
seems
not
merely
untrue
and
irrational
,
but
contrary
to
all
human
reality
.
