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The
Russian
army
,
they
say
,
in
its
retreat
from
Smolénsk
sought
out
for
itself
the
best
position
for
a
general
engagement
and
found
such
a
position
at
Borodinó
.
The
Russians
,
they
say
,
fortified
this
position
in
advance
on
the
left
of
the
highroad
(
from
Moscow
to
Smolénsk
)
and
almost
at
a
right
angle
to
it
,
from
Borodinó
to
Utítsa
,
at
the
very
place
where
the
battle
was
fought
.
In
front
of
this
position
,
they
say
,
a
fortified
outpost
was
set
up
on
the
Shevárdino
mound
to
observe
the
enemy
.
On
the
twenty-fourth
,
we
are
told
,
Napoleon
attacked
this
advanced
post
and
took
it
,
and
,
on
the
twenty-sixth
,
attacked
the
whole
Russian
army
,
which
was
in
position
on
the
field
of
Borodinó
.
So
the
histories
say
,
and
it
is
all
quite
wrong
,
as
anyone
who
cares
to
look
into
the
matter
can
easily
convince
himself
.
The
Russians
did
not
seek
out
the
best
position
but
,
on
the
contrary
,
during
the
retreat
passed
many
positions
better
than
Borodinó
.
They
did
not
stop
at
any
one
of
these
positions
because
Kutúzov
did
not
wish
to
occupy
a
position
he
had
not
himself
chosen
,
because
the
popular
demand
for
a
battle
had
not
yet
expressed
itself
strongly
enough
,
and
because
Milorádovich
had
not
yet
arrived
with
the
militia
,
and
for
many
other
reasons
.
The
fact
is
that
other
positions
they
had
passed
were
stronger
,
and
that
the
position
at
Borodinó
(
the
one
where
the
battle
was
fought
)
,
far
from
being
strong
,
was
no
more
a
position
than
any
other
spot
one
might
find
in
the
Russian
Empire
by
sticking
a
pin
into
the
map
at
hazard
.
Not
only
did
the
Russians
not
fortify
the
position
on
the
field
of
Borodinó
to
the
left
of
,
and
at
a
right
angle
to
,
the
highroad
(
that
is
,
the
position
on
which
the
battle
took
place
)
,
but
never
till
the
twenty-fifth
of
August
,
1812
,
did
they
think
that
a
battle
might
be
fought
there
.
This
was
shown
first
by
the
fact
that
there
were
no
entrenchments
there
by
the
twenty
fifth
and
that
those
begun
on
the
twenty-fifth
and
twenty-sixth
were
not
completed
,
and
secondly
,
by
the
position
of
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
.
That
redoubt
was
quite
senseless
in
front
of
the
position
where
the
battle
was
accepted
.
Why
was
it
more
strongly
fortified
than
any
other
post
?
And
why
were
all
efforts
exhausted
and
six
thousand
men
sacrificed
to
defend
it
till
late
at
night
on
the
twenty-fourth
?
A
Cossack
patrol
would
have
sufficed
to
observe
the
enemy
.
Thirdly
,
as
proof
that
the
position
on
which
the
battle
was
fought
had
not
been
foreseen
and
that
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
was
not
an
advanced
post
of
that
position
,
we
have
the
fact
that
up
to
the
twenty-fifth
,
Barclay
de
Tolly
and
Bagratión
were
convinced
that
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
was
the
left
flank
of
the
position
,
and
that
Kutúzov
himself
in
his
report
,
written
in
hot
haste
after
the
battle
,
speaks
of
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
as
the
left
flank
of
the
position
.
It
was
much
later
,
when
reports
on
the
battle
of
Borodinó
were
written
at
leisure
,
that
the
incorrect
and
extraordinary
statement
was
invented
(
probably
to
justify
the
mistakes
of
a
commander
in
chief
who
had
to
be
represented
as
infallible
)
that
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
was
an
advanced
post
--
whereas
in
reality
it
was
simply
a
fortified
point
on
the
left
flank
--
and
that
the
battle
of
Borodinó
was
fought
by
us
on
an
entrenched
position
previously
selected
,
whereas
it
was
fought
on
a
quite
unexpected
spot
which
was
almost
unentrenched
.
The
case
was
evidently
this
:
a
position
was
selected
along
the
river
Kolochá
--
which
crosses
the
highroad
not
at
a
right
angle
but
at
an
acute
angle
--
so
that
the
left
flank
was
at
Shevárdino
,
the
right
flank
near
the
village
of
Nóvoe
,
and
the
center
at
Borodinó
at
the
confluence
of
the
rivers
Kolochá
and
Vóyna
.
To
anyone
who
looks
at
the
field
of
Borodinó
without
thinking
of
how
the
battle
was
actually
fought
,
this
position
,
protected
by
the
river
Kolochá
,
presents
itself
as
obvious
for
an
army
whose
object
was
to
prevent
an
enemy
from
advancing
along
the
Smolénsk
road
to
Moscow
.
